Comparative Alternative Dispute Resolution for Individual Labor Disputes in Japan, China, and the United States: Lessons from Asia? by Brown, Ronald C.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 86 
Number 2 Volume 86, Spring-Summer 2012, 
Numbers 2-3 
Article 9 
April 2014 
Comparative Alternative Dispute Resolution for Individual Labor 
Disputes in Japan, China, and the United States: Lessons from 
Asia? 
Ronald C. Brown 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Brown, Ronald C. (2012) "Comparative Alternative Dispute Resolution for Individual Labor Disputes in 
Japan, China, and the United States: Lessons from Asia?," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 86 : No. 2 , Article 9. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol86/iss2/9 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
FINAL_Brown (Do Not Delete) 2/21/2013 12:13 PM 
 
543 
COMPARATIVE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION FOR INDIVIDUAL LABOR 
DISPUTES IN JAPAN, CHINA, AND THE 
UNITED STATES: LESSONS FROM ASIA? 
RONALD C. BROWN† 
INTRODUCTION 
Resolving individual labor rights disputes in East Asia and 
the United States in recent years has taken on new significance 
and prominence for both domestic and multinational 
corporations.1  New laws and approaches have been put into 
place in Japan, China, and the United States that deal with 
individual rights under either individual and/or collective 
contract or statutory labor disputes.  In 2004, Japan passed the 
judicial labor tribunal system,2 and in 2007, China implemented 
a new mediation and arbitration law,3 each with heralded 
success.  In 2009, the United States Supreme Court completed its 
approval of the use of private arbitration under individual and 
collective contracts to resolve both contractual and statutory 
labor disputes.4 
 
† Professor of Law, University of Hawaii Law School, Honolulu, Hawaii. 
1 Labor rights are to be distinguished from labor interests, which are not 
discussed in this paper. 
2 See Kobetsu funsou kaiketsu sokushin hou [Law on Promoting the Resolution 
of Individual Labor Disputes], Law No. 112 of 2001 (Japan), translated at 
http://www.jil.go.jp/jil/laborinfo-e/docs/llj_law8.pdf; see also Kazuo Sugeno, The Birth 
of the Labor Tribunal System in Japan: A Synthesis of Labor Law Reform and 
Judicial Reform, 25 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 519, 525 (2004); Takashi Araki, 
Establishment of the Labor Tribunal System: Lay Judge Participation in Japanese 
Labor Proceedings 6, http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~sota/info/Papers/Araki%20Labor% 
20Tribunal%20final080907.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2012). 
3 See Law on Mediation and Arbitration of Labor Disputes (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Congress, Dec. 29, 2007, effective May 1, 2008) 
(China), translated at http://tradeinservices.mofcom.gov.cn/en/b/2007-12-29/27880. 
shtml; see also RONALD C. BROWN, UNDERSTANDING LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 
IN CHINA 299 (2010). 
4 See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009). 
FINAL_Brown (Do Not Delete) 2/21/2013  12:13 PM 
544 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:543   
There are common themes and comparative contrasts in the 
uses of mediation and arbitration in the approaches of each 
country.  They may use governmental and/or private structures 
to house dispute settlement processes of individual and/or 
collective labor disputes, and mediation falls both inside and 
outside the arbitration process.  There are some interesting 
differences, with China and Japan keeping the processes largely 
under government regulation and institutions, whereas the U.S. 
provides legal authority to privatize much of the labor and 
employment law dispute resolution processes.  However, in 
practice that has not yet been widely implemented, with most 
statutory disputes resolved through administrative processes, 
and most non-union employment contracts resolved through the 
courts.  
The processes of resolving labor rights disputes in the U.S., 
China, and Japan, while appearing to use diverse approaches, 
actually have common themes, as well as their comparative 
contrasts.  Understanding their functionalities may present an 
opportunity for countries to choose the best practices from among 
these processes.  This may also afford the many multinational 
companies (“MNCs”) and others doing business in these countries 
the vantage point of evaluating the different methods of 
alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) processes and keeping the 
benefits of in-house mediation processes and their time and cost-
saving mediation settlements—even while using external 
neutrals. 
The variables in these ADR procedures include the degree of 
governmental regulation, if any, and whether to house the 
institutional processes within the government, in the private 
sector, or in some combination of the two.  ADR procedures vary 
on defining “labor disputes” for channeling into specific ADR 
processes; they may include individual and/or collective disputes, 
which can arise from either or both of contractual—individual or 
collective bargaining contracts—and/or statutory labor rights. 
The usual mechanisms of mediation, arbitration, and 
litigation are employed by all, though in different ways and with 
different legal effects.  While arbitration decisions may or may 
not be legally binding in different settings and in different 
countries, mediated settlements almost always are legally 
enforceable regardless of when or where they occurred—inside  
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the company or in the mediation process preceding an 
arbitration, or in or after the arbitration process itself, or in 
judicial proceedings before, during, or after any litigation. 
Existing mediation and arbitration institutional procedures 
each have their own time and cost considerations.  This Article 
proposes that perhaps consideration of the models of ADR used 
in labor disputes in Japan, China, and the U.S. may provide 
some guidance in possible redesigning of current ADR systems.  
Also, this Article proposes that MNCs consider the advantages of 
increased use of meaningful internal mediated settlement 
procedures in terms of time, cost, and finality through the 
bypassing of outside institutional procedures.  Whether they may 
legally displace regulatory requirements is another question and 
may vary by country and by the final method of settlement.  
Employees can also be benefitted when these internal mediation 
and arbitration processes contain sufficient due process-like 
protections, including an unbiased decisionmaker operating 
outside the control of the employer. 
I. OVERVIEW  
A. United States 
For individual employees in the U.S., employment contract 
disputes have traditionally been taken to the courts to be 
resolved.5  For statutory claims, an individual can grieve with a 
government administrative agency established to enforce the 
particular statute in question, such as the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and the National Labor 
Relations Board (“NLRB”).6  In recent years, however, the courts 
have allowed employees to accede to employer demands to 
contractually substitute a private labor arbitration forum for the 
judicial forum on both contractual and statutory claims.7  This  
 
 
 
5 See, e.g., Donald J. Farole, Jr., Contract Bench and Jury Trials in State Courts, 
2005, BUREAU JUST. STAT. BULL., Sept. 2009, at 1, 1–7, 9–10, 13, available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cbajtsc05.pdf. 
6 Instructions for filing a charge can be found online. See Filing a Charge, 
EEOC, www.eeoc.gov/facts/howtofil.html (last modified June 10, 1997); Frequently 
Asked Questions, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/faq/nlrb (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). 
7 See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
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forecloses the usual path for resolving statutory claims through 
the administrative agency forum, as it is bypassed and the court 
usually defers to arbitration.  
If an individual employee falls under the collective 
bargaining contract of a unionized workplace, then overlapping 
individual contract rights are replaced by the collective contract 
rights.8  Almost always, these collective contracts include private, 
non-governmental labor arbitration processes to resolve 
individual or group labor disputes arising out of the collective 
contract.  However, since in the U.S. fewer than ten percent of 
private workers are union members, collective labor contract 
(“CBK”) arbitration, while very significant—and available to non-
members under the CBK—does not affect a majority of American 
employees in the private sector.9   
In addition, courts almost always defer to arbitration awards 
under CBKs.10  Likewise, when statutory labor disputes are 
included, an appeal of the arbitration award will also be deferred 
to by the court.11  In 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court allowed 
unions, under a collective contract—like those under an 
individual labor contract—to agree to substitute a private labor 
arbitration forum for the court forum, foreclosing the usual 
administrative review and resulting in court deference to the 
arbitration decision.12 
 
8 See J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 334–36 (1944). Currently in the 
United States, in the private sector, fewer than ten percent of eligible workers are 
union members. Economic News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union 
Members Summary (Jan. 27, 2012) [hereinafter Union Members Summary], 
available at www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm. 
9 In 2011, 6.9 percent of private workers belonged to unions, while the total 
percentage was 11.8 percent with 14.8 million members. Union Members Summary, 
supra note 8.  
10 Likewise, there often is administrative deferral. For example, the NLRB has a 
long-standing policy of deferring to arbitration dealing with the resolution of 
pending unfair labor practices that factually overlap with the collective bargaining 
agreement if it is adequately resolved by the arbitration process and decision. See 
United Techs. Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 559–60 (1984); Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 
573 (1984). 
11 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (individual employment contract); United Steelworkers 
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960) (collective bargaining 
contract). 
12 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009). Currently, such contract 
provisions authorizing statutory claims to be arbitrated are not popular with unions 
for a number of reasons, including increased responsibilities and liabilities. 
Additionally, a bill has been introduced in Congress, the Arbitration Fairness Act 
(“AFA”), proposing a law that would amend the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 
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The collective bargaining contract issues arbitrated by 
private arbitrators are comprehensive and expansive, ranging 
from affirmative action to working conditions.  In recent years, 
the number of Federal Mediation & Conciliation Service 
(“FMCS”)13 labor arbitration panel requests has decreased from 
19,023 in 200314 to 16,486 in 2010.15  At the same time that the 
number of FMCS panel requests has been decreasing, the 
number of collective labor disputes has declined.  It decreased 
from twenty-two major work stoppages involving 99,600 workers 
in 200516 to eleven major work stoppages involving 45,000 
workers in 2010.17 
In sum, the American system of resolving individual labor 
disputes can be identified as having the following general 
characteristics:   
(1)  Individual contractual labor disputes of employees in 
the U.S. are typically resolved in the courts, not in 
labor arbitration.  
(2)  Statutory labor disputes in the U.S. are primarily dealt 
with by government administrative agencies, with 
review by the courts. 
(3)  Collective contractual labor disputes of individuals in 
the U.S., under contracts negotiated by unions, use 
non-governmental labor arbitration to resolve labor 
disputes over contract interpretations. 
 
9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006), to prohibit most pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate 
employment claims or civil rights claims. Arbitration Fairness Act, S. 931, 111th 
Cong. (2009). There also has been a bill in Congress, the Employee Free Choice Act 
(“EFCA”), which would enable unions to get bargaining rights through signed 
authorization cards rather than a secret-ballot election; it would provide for the 
arbitration of first-contract terms if negotiations failed to produce an agreement 
after four months. Employee Free Choice Act, S. 560, 111th Cong. (2009).  
13 Arbitration Statistics Fiscal Year 2010, FED. MED. & CONCILIATION SERV., 
http://fmcs.gov/assets/files/Arbitration/FY_2010_Statistics/Issues_Arbitrated.doc 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2012).  
14 Panel Requests by Region, FED. MED. & CONCILIATION SERV. (Oct. 21, 2005), 
http://www.fmcs.gov/assets/files/Arbitration/FY2005PanelRequestsbyState.doc. 
15 Panel Requests by Region, FED. MED. & CONCILIATION SERV. (Oct. 1, 2010), 
http://fmcs.gov/assets/files/Arbitration/FY_2010_Statistics/Panel_Requests_by_State
_2010.doc. 
16 News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Major Work Stoppages in 2006, 
(Feb. 27, 2007), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/wkstp_0227 
2007.pdf.  
17 News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Major Work Stoppages in 2011, 
(Feb. 8, 2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/wkstp.pdf. 
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(4)  U.S. courts permit the substitution of the arbitration 
forum for the judicial forum in statutory and 
contractual labor rights of employees.  While still  a 
minority view, there is a growing trend in its use, 
particularly in individual (rather than collective) 
employment contracts. 
(5)  The U.S. uses both government and non-government 
forums to resolve labor disputes depending on whether 
the source of the labor right in dispute is contractual 
or statutory, and, in the former, usually whether it is 
an individual or collective contract. 
(6)  U.S. courts generally defer to the labor dispute 
decisions of labor arbitrators and administrative 
agencies.18 
B. China19 
China’s labor arbitration system that resolves labor disputes 
is much broader and more centralized than the system in the 
U.S.  In China, except for challenges to bureaucratic decisions—
for example, disputes over the certified percentage of a work-
related injury—most “labor disputes,” contractual and statutory, 
arising out of the employment relationship are taken to the 
government-provided labor arbitration process.20  Contractual 
claims can arise from individual or collective labor contracts. 
Labor disputes arising from statutory or contractual bases 
are resolved by the labor mediation and arbitration processes.  
The mediation process is voluntary, begins within the enterprise, 
and involves the union, the employer, and the employee.21  
Arbitration is also available, and claims must be filed within 
time limits.22  The Labor Mediation and Arbitration Law (“LMA”) 
 
18 An “exception” is illustrated by EEOC decisions that are not deferred to, but 
rather given appropriate weight. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 
60 n.21 (1974). Likewise, an arbitration decision will not preclude the EEOC from 
prosecuting a case, though the available remedy is affected. See EEOC v. Waffle 
House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 301 (2002). 
19 See BROWN, supra note 3, at 168–83. 
20 Law on Mediation and Arbitration of Labor Disputes, supra note 3, art. 2; see 
also BROWN, supra note 3, at 168; Labour Arbitration Law Welcome but Systemic 
Change, Investment Needed, CHINA LAB. BULL. (Apr. 23, 2008) [hereinafter Labour 
Arbitration Law Welcome], http://www.clb.org.hk/en/node/100244. 
21 BROWN, supra note 3, at 171–72. 
22 The former sixty-day filing deadline was extended to one year. See Law on 
Mediation and Arbitration of Labor Disputes, supra note 3; see also BROWN, supra 
note 3, at 172–73; Labour Arbitration Law Welcome, supra note 20.  
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became effective on May 1, 2008.23  It provides increased 
accessibility for employees and greater finality to the arbitration 
process.24  It also clarifies the relationship of arbitration awards 
to judicial appeal and review.25  Certain exceptions to the usual 
requirement of exhaustion of arbitration before judicial review 
are now included where more direct access to the court is 
permitted.26  The new law has spurred an increased use of 
arbitration.  For example, many courts and arbitrators handled 
more labor disputes in 2009 than a year earlier, after 
introduction of rules giving workers more rights and making 
arbitration free.27 
 
23 Law on Mediation and Arbitration of Labor Disputes, supra note 3, art. 54; see 
also Labour Arbitration Law Welcome, supra note 20. 
24 Law on Mediation and Arbitration of Labor Disputes, supra note 3, arts. 47–
50. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. arts. 16, 29. Expedited access to the courts is possible through Article 44 
for certain categories of cases that authorize the arbitration tribunal to send the 
decision directly to the court for execution. Id. art. 44. 
27 Edward Wong, Global Crisis Adds to Surge of Labor Disputes in Chinese 
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2010, at A9. Interestingly, in 2010, the number of 
arbitrations nationally has leveled off, see id., whereas the number of labor dispute 
cases in court has risen. It is reported that “[i]n 2009 labor dispute arbitration 
organizations . . . nation-wide handled 875,000 cases. Some 684,000 cases were 
accepted for arbitration, a decrease of 1.3 percent compared to the previous year. 
The cases involved 1.017 million workers, a decrease of 16.3 percent compared to the 
previous year.” China’s Human Resources, GOV.CN, http://www.gov.cn/english/ 
official/2010-09/10/content_1700448_16.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). Also, it was 
reported that in 2008, the courts handled about 286,000 labor dispute cases, an 
increase of 94 percent from 2007; whereas the 2009 figure was up to about 317,000 
cases. See China’s Labour Dispute Resolution System, CHINA LAB. BULL. (Nov. 26, 
2009), available at http://www.clb.org.hk/en/node/100618; Chinese Courts Complete 
317,000 Labor Dispute Cases in 2009, CHINA.ORG.CN (Sept. 13, 2010), 
http://www.china.org.cn/china/2010-09/13/content_20917787.htm. Additional 
examples in specific areas were reported as follows: “[I]n Jiangsu Province, the total 
number of labor disputes heard by Courts at all levels in 2007 was 12,480. This 
number increased to 29,862 in 2008, 33,362 in 2009 and 34,111 in 2010. In 
Shanghai, the total number of labor disputes heard by the Shanghai No. 2 
Intermediate Court in 2010 was 2,607, 17.12% higher than the number in 2009.” 
Jonathan M. Isaacs et al., Government Encourages More Mediation in Light of 
Drastic Increase in Labor Disputes, CHINA EMP. L. UPDATE, June 2011, at 4, 5, 
available at http://www.bakermckenzie.com/NLChinaEmploymentLawUpdate 
Jun11/ (noting also that pre-2008 statistics of cases filed in arbitration show the 
dramatic increase in cases in 2008); see also Number of Cases Accepted by Labour 
Dispute Arbitration Committees 1996–2008, CHINA LAB. BULL., 
http://www.clb.org.hk/en/files/share/File/statistics/disputes/number_of_disputes_199
6-2008.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). 
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The scope of subjects of labor arbitration is large and 
increasing, often varying by region.28  The number of labor 
arbitration cases grew from 10,326 in 1989 to about 693,000 in 
2008, an increase of more than six thousand percent and an 
annual rise of 10.4% from 2006 to 2007 and ninety-eight percent 
from 2007 to 2008. 29  In 2007, the 350,182 cases involved 653,472 
workers, and in 2008, the 693,000 cases involved 1,200,000 
workers.30  In addition, “labor dispute arbitration organizations 
at various levels nationwide handled 875,000 
cases . . . involv[ing] 1.017 million workers . . . .”31  At the same 
time the number of arbitration cases has been increasing, the 
number of collective labor disputes has also increased.  It 
increased from 15,464 cases in 2006 involving 81,639 workers to 
30,385 cases in 2009 involving 68,649 workers.32 
In sum, the Chinese system of resolving labor disputes can 
be identified as having the following general characteristics:   
(1)  Individual contractual labor disputes of employees in 
China are mostly resolved in labor arbitration within 
government administrative agencies, with limited 
access to the courts. 
(2)  Statutory labor disputes in China are mostly resolved 
in labor arbitration within government administrative 
agencies, with limited access to the courts. 
 
28 RONALD BROWN, FOUND. FOR L., JUST., & SOC’Y, CHINA LABOUR DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 2 [hereinafter CHINA LABOUR DISPUTE RESOLUTION], available at 
http://www.fljs.org/uploads/documents/Brown%231%23.pdf.  
29 Id. at 3; Number of Cases Accepted by the Labour Dispute Arbitration 
Committees 1996–2008, supra note 27.  
30 Number of Cases Accepted by the Labour Dispute Arbitration Committees 
1996–2008, supra note 27. In view of this increase and the strain it places on the 
arbitration tribunals, the Chinese government is proposing an increased use of 
mediation. The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (“MOHRSS”) 
issued the draft Measures Concerning Enterprise Labor Dispute Consultation and 
Mediation on June 3, 2010. Isaacs, supra note 27, at 4. Under these measures, 
“enterprises that have more than 300 employees shall . . . establish their own labor 
dispute mediation committees.” Id. However, currently no penalty is provided for 
non-compliance. Id. 
31 Info. Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s 
Human Resources, BEIJING REV. (last updated Oct. 13, 2010), 
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/document/txt/2010-10/13/content_303463_4.htm.  
32 CHINA LABOUR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 28; see also Cheng-Guan 
Hwang, Labor-Capital Disputes in Taiwan: Statistics and Handling Mechanism, AP-
IRNET, http://ap-irnet.ilobkk.or.th/resources/labour-dispute-resolution-in-china/at_ 
download/file3 (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). 
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(3)  Collective contractual labor disputes of individuals in 
China, under contracts negotiated by unions, are 
mostly resolved in labor arbitration within 
government administrative agencies, with limited 
access to the courts. 
(4)  Mediated settlements occurring before, during, or after 
arbitration are common, and courts generally defer to 
them. 
(5)  Chinese courts generally defer to the labor dispute 
decisions of labor arbitrators, except in prescribed 
areas.  
C. Japan 
Individual labor rights disputes arise in many ways, 
including from discipline, termination, and contract violations.  
They may arise from contractual or statutory labor rights and 
may involve an individual or collective labor right.  The processes 
of dispute resolution in Japan are housed in government 
institutions and vary, depending on whether the right is 
individual or collective.33  Collective labor disputes are resolved 
 
33 Although an individual covered by a collective bargaining agreement can file a 
grievance under its collective contract, as noted in the following comments, it is not a 
widely used or effective means of individual ADR for individual labor disputes. 
While individual labor grievance-arbitration provisions may be used, see, e.g., 
RENGO Model Contract, labor arbitration must, under law, be advisory only, since 
the two options available to an individual are civil proceedings or the Labor 
Tribunal. See Makoto Ishida & Ryo Hosokawa, Developments in 2004–Major 
Legislation & Treaties: Labor Law, 24 WASEDA BULL. COMP. L. 59, 59–61 (2006), 
available at http://www.waseda.jp/hiken/jp/public/bulletin/pdf/24/ronbun/A02859211-
00-000240059.pdf; see also JAPAN INST. FOR LAB. POL’Y & TRAINING, LABOR 
SITUATION IN JAPAN AND ANALYSIS: GENERAL OVERVIEW 2009/2010 104 (2009) 
[herinafter LABOR SITUATION IN JAPAN], available at http://www.jil.go.jp/english/ 
laborsituation/general/2009-2010.html; JAPAN INST. FOR LAB. POL’Y & TRAINING 
RES. REP., RESEARCH ON SUPPORT FOR DEVELOPMENT OF IN-HOUSE DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS (2008), available at www.jil.go.jp/english/reports/documents/ 
jilpt-research/no.98.pdf; Interview with Judge Kazutaka Tanaka, Labor Tribunal, 
Tokyo District Court (Nov. 14, 2010).  
Labor conflict resolution machineries have concentrated on collective 
dispute settlement in Japan. Grievance procedures stipulated in labor 
contracts have not been working effectively. The center of gravity of labor-
management relations has shifted from collective bargaining with labor 
unions to individual labor contracts with individual workers both in the 
unorganized sector and the non-union members within the organized 
sector . . . . Vague demarcation between rights and interest disputes as well 
as between collective and individual disputes characterize the dispute 
settlement machineries in Japan. 
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by the Labor Commission, although individual complaints 
arising under the collective agreement may be brought by the 
individual in the courts or Labor Tribunal, as described below.34   
 
Kazutoshi Koshiro, Formal and Informal Aspects of Labor Dispute Resolution in 
Japan, 22 LAW & POL’Y 353, 353 (2000). Indeed, it is reported that grievance 
procedures usually “do not function effectively. Arbitration of individual grievances, 
or minor dispute[s] (dispute[s] of rights), [are] almost alien to Japan.” Id. at 355. 
Also, “[a]ccording to the Ministry of Labor’s Survey on Labor-Management 
Communications in 1999 published in June 2000, only 25.2 percent of the 
undertakings surveyed had grievance procedures.” Id. “Only 37.4 percent of the 
workers surveyed presented their grievances or complaints to their employers or 
supervisors.” Id. “Because of the ineffectiveness of these grievance procedures in 
Japan [in 2002], the most important route to resolve labor disputes of rights [was by] 
civil lawsuits.” Id. at 358. For law dealing with collective bargaining contract 
disputes, see Labor Relations Adjustment Act, Law No. 25 of 1946, art. 29 (Japan), 
translated at http://www.jil.go.jp/english/laborinfo/library/documents/llj_law3.pdf, 
and Labor Union Act, Law No. 174 of 1949 (Japan), translated at www.jil.go.jp/ 
english/laborinfo/library/documents/llj_law2.pdf. 
34 On occasion, a Prefectural Labor Relations Commission (“LRC”), whose 
essential role is to deal with collective disputes, also has authority to conduct 
mediation for individual labor disputes (except for in Tokyo, Hyogo, and Fukuoka). 
In this case, the panel of mediators is tripartite. See Act on Promoting the 
Resolution of Individual Labor-Related Disputes, supra note 2, art. 21. In 2010, the 
Central Labor Relations Commission reported the number of conciliation cases of 
individual labor disputes by forty-four Prefectural Labour Relations Commissions in 
2010 to be 423, decreasing by 111 cases or 20.8% from the previous year. Recent 
Statistical Survey Reports, JAPAN INST. FOR LAB. POL’Y & TRAINING (May 2011), 
http://www.jil.go.jp/english/estatis/esaikin/2011/e201105.htm. Collective labor 
disputes, including unfair labor practices, are dealt with by the Labor Commission 
(that is, the Japanese “National Labor Relations Board”). Koshiro, supra note 33, at 
356–57; see also WILLIAM B. GOULD, JAPAN’S RESHAPING OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 
27 (1984). The Labor Relations Commission is a tripartite system under the Trade 
Union Law comprised of commissioners representing the public, employers, and 
workers. Araki, supra note 2, at 2. In order to bring a dispute before the 
Commission, a union must qualify for recognition under Article 2 of the Trade Union 
Law. Labor Union Act, supra note 33, arts. 2, 5. The procedures for the resolution of 
collective disputes are set forth in the Labor Relations Adjustment Act, which 
emphasizes voluntary settlement of disputes. Labor Relations Adjustment Act, 
supra note 33, art. 34. If the Prefectural Labor Relations Commission determines 
that an unfair labor practice has occurred, the Commission may issue a remedial 
order (such as reinstatement of an employee, ordering an employer to bargain in 
good faith, et cetera). Japan’s Labour Relations Commission System, MINISTRY OF 
HEALTH, LAB. & WELFARE, http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/org/policy/dl/08.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2012). An employer may appeal the order of a Prefectural Labor 
Relations Committee to the Central Labor Commission or seek judicial review. Id. 
Mediation and conciliation results may be rejected by the parties. Id. Arbitration 
awards are binding. Id; see Labor Relations Adjustment Act, supra note 33, art. 34; 
KAZUO SUGENO, JAPANESE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW 554 (Leo Kanowitz trans., 
2002). The reference to “binding” relates only to collective disputes under the Trade 
Union Law, as individual labor disputes can be taken to the courts and its Labor 
Tribunal, where arbitration is binding only upon mutual agreement of the parties. 
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As to resolving disputes over individual labor rights, there 
are several alternatives available.  First, an individual can claim 
a violation with the Labor Administration Offices and seek 
resolution by adjustment or conciliation or mediation.  Second, a 
complaint can be resolved by the court in a regular civil 
procedure presided over by a judge.  Or third, since 2006, a 
complaint can be filed with the court, and a procedure for the 
appointment of a Labor Tribunal Panel can be initiated that 
utilizes mediation and non-binding arbitration to resolve the 
dispute.35  If the Tribunal does not resolve the dispute, the case 
can proceed to the court’s usual civil process.36 
1. Overview of Labor Dispute Resolution System 
FIGURE 1:  
OVERVIEW OF LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 See Araki, supra note 2, at 2–3. 
36 Id. at 10. 
37 Id. at 2. 
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Labor administration offices are available for alleged 
violations of individual labor rights (employment law).  The 
prefectural Labor Offices, which are the local offices of the 
Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, provide counseling 
and mediation services on labor issues.38  “Since the Labor Offices 
launched such services, the number of complaints received by 
the Labor Offices has also been increased annually . . . .”39  The 
issues involved in individual labor disputes are comprehensive, 
ranging from wage increases to objections to the discontinuance, 
shutdown, or contraction of a business.40  The total number of 
labor consultations grew from 824,000 in 2004 to 1,141,000 in 
2009, while the number of individual labor and management 
dispute consultations also grew from 160,000 in 2004 to 247,000 
in 2009.41   
 
 
 
38 Id. at 6. 
39 Id. 
40 JAPAN INST. FOR LABOR POL’Y & TRAINING, JAPANESE WORKING LIFE  
PROFILE 2010/2011—LABOR STATISTICS 74–75 (2010), available at 
http://www.jil.go.jp/english/workinglifeprofile/2010-2011/all.pdf.  
41 Id. at 74. Labor consultations included termination (24.5%), change of work 
conditions (13.5%), bullying and harassment (12.7%), inducements toward 
retirement (9.4%), and recruitment and hiring (1.1%). Id. Labor disputes by 
principal demands in 2008 included objections to discharge or issues of 
reinstatement (173), wage increases (111), temporary allowance (99), and revision of 
working hours (8). Id. at 75. The Individual Labor Dispute Solution System is based 
on the 2001 Act on Promoting the Resolution of Individual Labor-Related Disputes. 
It clarifies the jurisdictional application of the later law and states:   
Article 3[:] The Director of the Prefectural Labor Bureau, in order to 
prevent the occurrence of individual labor-related disputes, and to promote 
the voluntary resolution of individual labor-related disputes, shall provide 
workers, job applicants and business operators with information on matters 
concerning labor relationships and matters concerning the recruitment and 
employment of workers and give consultations and other assistance. 
. . . .  
Article 5[:] In a case where one or both parties (hereinafter referred to as 
“disputing parties”) to an individual labor-related dispute set forth in 
paragraph 1 of the preceding article (except disputes with respect to a 
matters [sic] concerning the recruitment and employment of workers) files 
an application for mediation with respect to said individual labor-related 
dispute, if the Director of the Prefectural Labor Bureau finds it necessary 
for the resolution of said individual labor-related dispute, the Director shall 
have the Dispute Coordinating Committee conduct mediation.  
Act on Promoting the Resolution of Individual Labor-Related Disputes, supra note 2, 
arts. 3, 5.  
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At the same time that the number of consultations has been 
increasing, the number of collective labor disputes has declined.  
It decreased from 118 disputes in 2000 involving 15,000 workers 
to 52 disputes involving 8,300 workers in 2008.42 
When there is a possible violation of employment law, the 
Labor Office will refer the matter to the Labor Standards 
Inspection Office for further investigation, which may in turn 
either issue a notice of recommendation—usually a request for an 
apology or other minor remedial action—to the respondent on 
behalf of the complainant, or refer the complainant and 
respondent to the Dispute Adjustment Commission for 
mediation/conciliation.43  “The Dispute Adjustment Committee 
can provide a mediation proposal but it is up to the parties 
whether or not to accept it.”44  The parties are free to pursue 
remedies in the court in a de novo hearing.45 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 JAPAN INST. FOR LABOR POL’Y & TRAINING, DATABOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
LABOUR STATISTICS 2011 209–10 (2011), available at http://www.jil.go.jp/kokunai/ 
statistics/databook/2011/07/p209-210_t7-3.pdf.  
43 Sugeno, supra note 2. 
44 Araki, supra note 2. The Dispute Adjustment Commission is comprised of 
three to twelve commissioners serving two-year terms, part-time. Law on Promoting 
the Resolution of Individual Labour Disputes, supra note 2, arts. 6–8. Mediators are 
typically practicing lawyers and law professors. Sugeno, supra note 2. In 2003, out of 
approximately 170,000 consultation cases handled by all of the national labor offices, 
about 4,500 were resolved with notices of recommendation and 5,000 cases were 
mediated. Sugeno, supra note 2, at 525–26. In 2008, 8,457 applications for mediation 
were received, and procedures were completed for 7,920. State of the Operation of 
Individual Labour Dispute Solution System, MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LAB., & 
WELFARE, available at http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/wp/wp-hw3/dl/4-43.pdf. 
Agreement was reached in 2,647 cases, 4,654 were discontinued, and 587 had the 
applications withdrawn. Id. On occasion, a Prefectural Labor Relations Commission, 
whose essential role is to deal with collective disputes, also conducts mediation for 
individual labor disputes (except for Tokyo, Hyogo, and Fukuoka). In this case, the 
panel of mediators is tripartite. See Act on Promoting the Resolution of Individual 
Labor-Related Disputes, supra note 2, art. 12.  
45 Outline of Civil Litigation in Japan, SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, 
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/proceedings/civil_suit_index/civil_suit/index.html#i 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2012) (explaining the Code of Civil Procedure of 1996). 
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2. Labor Administration Offices 
FIGURE 2:  
INDIVIDUAL LABOR DISPUTE SOLUTION SYSTEM46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 The Outline Chart of Individual Labour Dispute Solution System, MINISTRY 
OF HEALTH, LAB. & WELFARE, http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/wp/wp-hw3/dl/4-42.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2012).  
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FIGURE 3: 
STATE OF THE OPERATION OF INDIVIDUAL LABOR DISPUTE 
SOLUTION SYSTEM47 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47 State of the Operation of Individual Labour Dispute Solution System, supra 
note 44. 
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3. Courts and Labor Tribunal System48 
In addition to and without prior administrative conciliation 
or mediation, an individual worker may proceed in district court 
with a civil claim under a labor statute or contract, individual or 
collective.49  In 2008 and 2009, 4,493 and 6,686 labor cases, 
respectively, were filed in civil court, including 2,441 and 3,218 
cases, respectively, proceeding in the Labor Tribunal.50  Since the 
effective date of 2006, workers may choose to take the case to 
court and first utilize the Labor Tribunal System that employs 
mediation and arbitration procedures in attempts to bring the 
parties to settlement.51  It has a very high success rate:  As of 
2009, 3,500 cases per year were filed with the Tribunal, with two 
and one-half months being the average duration for the 
procedures and eighty percent of the filed cases being settled.52  
Typical disputes covered under the courts and the labor tribunals 
involve “disputes over rights between individual employees and 
employers,”53 such as “dismissals, job changes, pay claims, 
retirement allowance claims, disciplinary actions and the 
 
48 See generally Katsutoshi Kezuka, Significance and Tasks Involved in 
Establishment of a Labor Tribunal System, 3 JAPAN LAB. REV. 13 (2006), available at 
http://www.jil.go.jp/english/JLR/documents/2006/JLR09_Kezuka.pdf. 
49 The process is as follows: 
The employee files a complaint with the District Court as a court of first 
instance. Each District Court has jurisdiction over a region which in 
general corresponds to the given prefecture. Cases at the District Court are 
presided over by a single judge but may be heard by a panel of three equal 
judges, if it decides that the gravity of the case warrants it. The losing 
party in the first instance may appeal (Koso) the judgement [sic] of the 
District Court to a High Court. There are 8 High Courts in Japan, each 
with an [sic] own territorial jurisdiction. The court of appeal inquires into 
the fact [sic] and law once more and decides in a panel of three judges. The 
party dissatisfied with the High Court’s judgement [sic] may appeal 
(Jokoku) to the Supreme Court as the court of last resort but needs to 
succeed [on] the procedure of admission first, since the Supreme Court can 
refuse the appeal in view of a lack of importance. In the Supreme Court, 
the case is usually heard by the Petty Bench consisting of 5 judges.  
Liliane Jung, National Labour Law Profile: Japan, INT’L LAB. ORG. (June 17, 2011), 
http://www.ilo.org/ifpdial/information-resources/national-labour-law-profiles/WCMS_ 
158904/lang--en/index.htm. 
50 Takashi Araki, Japan’s Labor Tribunal System Established in 2006:  
From “Precise-Justice” To “Resolution-Oriented Justice”? (Univ. of Tokyo), 
http://isllss.huji.ac.il/110106Final%20Jerusalem(Araki).ppt (last visited Nov. 1, 
2012). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Ishida & Hosokawa, supra note 33, at 62.   
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working condition changes.”54  In addition, “when disputes occur 
over the rights of individual employees concerning 
discrimination, changes of working conditions and layoffs,” the 
labor tribunal has jurisdiction over the individual’s dispute, 
“even if it is a group dispute.”55 
Upon hearing the complaint, the district court organizes a 
labor tribunal composed of a career judge, a representative from 
labor, and a representative from management.56  Labor and 
management representatives are appointed to the district court 
on a part-time basis for a two-year term before they are assigned 
to individual cases.57  The tribunal sends a copy of the complaint 
to the respondent and notifies both parties of their appearance 
date.58  Proceedings are informal and generally not open to the 
public.59  To limit the time to a final decision, hearings are 
limited to three sessions intended to take no more than three to 
four months from start to finish.60  At the third session, the 
tribunal will propose a settlement.61  If either party rejects this, 
the tribunal will issue a decision.62  If neither party rejects the 
decision or if they mutually accept it, the decision becomes 
binding.63  If both parties reject the decision, it is not binding and 
the matter will be returned to the district court where the parties 
may continue with civil litigation if so desired.64 
 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 63. 
56 See Sugeno, supra note 2, at 530. 
The Labor Tribunal Committee (LTC), thus, comprises one professional 
judge and two lay members, both of whom are experts in labor relations. 
Although these two experts are recommended by Rengo (Japanese Trade 
Union Confederation) and Nippon Keidanren (Japan Business Federation), 
in practice, they must be fair and impartial in the handling of the case. 
These experts participate in decision making on equal footing with the 
professional judge member.  
Araki, supra note 2, at 9–10.  
57 Law on Promoting the Resolution of Individual Labor Disputes, supra note 2, 
art. 8; Sugeno, supra note 2, at 530.  
58 Sugeno, supra note 2, at 530. 
59 Araki, supra note 2, at 8. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 14. 
62 Id.  
63 Id. at 10. 
64 SUGENO, supra note 34, at 681; Araki, supra note 2, at 10. From April 2006 to 
March 2007 “nearly 80%” of the cases filed with the Labor Tribunals “were resolved 
through the Labor Tribunal procedures.” Id. at 11 (citing Akihiko Ohtake, Kaishi-go 
1 nen wo heta Rodo Shinpan Seido no Genjo to Kadai [The Current Situation and 
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FIGURE 4: 
OVERVIEW OF THE LABOR TRIBUNAL SYSTEM65 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Future Issues after One Year Operation of the Labor Tribunal System] 217 KIKAN 
RODO-HO 53 (2007)). Likewise, this high percentage of case resolution at 80% or 
above continued through 2009. Employment Litigation in Japan, ORRICK, 
www.orrick.com/fileupload/3716.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). See generally LABOR 
SITUATION IN JAPAN, supra note 33, at 99–107. 
65 Araki, supra note 2, at 9 fig.6. 
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In sum, the Japanese system of resolving individual labor 
disputes can be identified as having the following general 
characteristics:   
(1)  Individual contractual labor disputes of employees in 
Japan can be ultimately resolved in the courts or in 
the court’s Labor Tribunal System.  
(2)  Statutory labor disputes in Japan are primarily dealt 
with by government labor administration offices, in 
the courts, or in the court’s Labor Tribunal System.  
(3)  Individual labor disputes arising under collective 
contracts negotiated by unions can have the individual 
labor dispute rights resolved by courts or in Labor 
Tribunals. 
(4)  Mediation is used by the administration labor offices 
and the Labor Tribunal to permit mediated 
settlements for the individual labor rights of 
employees.  A high percentage of cases heard in the 
Labor Tribunal result in successfully mediated 
settlements.66  Japanese courts generally honor and 
defer to the mediated settlements arising from the 
labor administration offices and the Labor Tribunals 
and to the agreed-upon arbitrations of the Labor 
Tribunals. 
II. COMPARING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE U.S., CHINA, AND 
JAPAN IN RESOLVING INDIVIDUAL LABOR DISPUTES 
A. Venue: Government or Private? 
In the U.S., the primary venue for resolving individuals’ 
contractual employment disputes traditionally has been the 
courts, though for unionized workers—a small percentage of the 
work force—the private arbitration venue is used.  A small 
percentage of cases, but growing, percentage of cases use private 
arbitration in individual employment agreements.67  
 
 
 
66 See Araki, supra note 2, at 11. 
67 See John-Paul Alexandrowicz, A Comparative Analysis of the Law Regulating 
Employment Arbitration Agreements in the United States and Canada, 23 COMP. 
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 1007, 1009 (2002). 
FINAL_Brown (Do Not Delete) 2/21/2013  12:13 PM 
562 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:543   
For disputes under labor statutes, the primary avenue for 
resolution is the use of labor administrative agencies.68  There is 
a small but growing trend to consensually agree to substitute 
private arbitration for administrative agencies and the courts, 
but this approach is not yet in wide use.69 
In China, labor dispute resolution is institutionalized by the 
government, with most labor disputes, contractual and statutory, 
resolved in the government-provided mediation-arbitration 
system, though a significant number still reach and are resolved 
in the courts.70 
In Japan, workers may seek to consult over labor disputes or 
resolve statutory labor disputes with a labor administrative 
agency or with the courts or within the court’s labor tribunals.71  
Likewise, workers may also bring contractual—as well as 
statutory—employment labor disputes directly to the courts 
and/or its labor tribunals; these can include individual labor 
rights arising under a collective bargaining agreement.72  
B. Source of Labor Disputes 
As discussed above, the type of labor dispute controls the 
available avenues for resolution of the labor dispute.  Individual 
employment contracts are dealt with by courts or government 
institutions in the U.S., China, and Japan, albeit with some use 
of private arbitration in the U.S. in individual employment 
agreements and in unionized settings, where private arbitration 
is the norm.73 
Statutory labor disputes of individuals may be resolved, in 
the first instance, by government administrative agencies in the 
U.S., Japan (labor administration offices), and China (in labor 
arbitration commissions).74  Alternatively, in Japan, these may 
be resolved in the first instance by the courts or by labor 
 
68 See, e.g., Filing a Charge, supra note 6. 
69 See Kia C. Franklin, The Injustice of Private Arbitration, WASH. POST, Apr. 
21, 2008, at A14; see also Ross Runkel, Arbitration of Employment Disputes: The 
New Privatization of the Judicial System, LAWMEMO (Apr. 1, 2004), 
http://www.lawmemo.com/articles/arb.htm.  
70 See supra notes 20–27 and accompanying text.   
71 See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
72 See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text. 
73 See supra notes 5, 7, 20, 33–34 and accompanying text. 
74 See supra notes 11, 20, 34 and accompanying text. 
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tribunals.75  In the U.S., there is also a small but growing use of 
private arbitration being voluntarily substituted for the 
administrative and judicial processes.76  
C. Mediation Processes 
Mediation is a widely used approach in each country’s 
handling of labor disputes, including in the courts.  In the U.S., 
China, and Japan, it may begin in variant forms within 
companies—possibly through the use of committees—that 
operate more like negotiations or conciliation between or among 
the parties seeking accommodations and settlements.77  In 
unionized settings, mediation is provided in coordination with 
the union, often in the preliminary steps of the grievance 
arbitration procedures.78  Otherwise, it is a procedure established 
by the employer on a non-mandatory basis seeking to encourage 
accommodations and settlements.  In China, this process is 
available intra-company on a voluntary basis.79  In all settings, it 
makes sense in the context of human resource management to 
have a system such as mediation to defuse and possibly resolve 
labor disputes. 
Institutionalized mediation procedures (and/or conciliation) 
outside any employer procedures, are available in each country, 
though to varying extents.  Government-provided mediation 
services are available in Japan in all forums—the  
administration labor agency, courts, and labor tribunals.  As 
discussed above, the percentage of mediated settlements in the 
Labor Tribunal has been exceptionally high, at eighty percent.80  
 
75 See Koshiro, supra note 33, at 356. 
76 See supra text accompanying note 7. 
77 See, e.g., Susan K. Hippensteele, Revisiting the Promise of Mediation for 
Employment Discrimination Claims, 9 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 211, 232 (2009); 
Hilary K. Josephs, Measuring Progress Under China’s Labor Law: Goals, Processes, 
Outcomes, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 373, 385 n.68 (2009); Kristina T. Geraghty, 
Note, Taming the Paper Tiger: A Comparative Approach to Reforming Japanese 
Gender Equality Laws, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 503, 511 (2008). 
78 See, e.g., ADVISORY, CONCILIATION & ARBITRATION SERV., MEDIATION: A 
GUIDE FOR TRADE UNION REPRESENTATIVES 3, 8 (2010), available at 
http://www.acas.org.uk/media/pdf/m/7/Acas_TUC_Mediation_Guide_AUGUST_2010
_(Final).pdf. 
79 CHINA LABOUR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 28, at 3. 
80 Araki, supra note 2, at 11. 
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Likewise, in China, the use and success of mediation and 
mediated settlements is high, and it is used extensively in 
arbitration, as well as in the courts.81  
In the U.S., mediation is available but infrequently employed 
in individual employment contract disputes.82  For statutory labor 
disputes, conciliation is used extensively in the procedures of 
administrative agencies prior to appeals for post-decision, 
judicial determination.83  Courts also use mediation.84  
D. Arbitration Processes 
In the U.S., labor arbitration of contract labor disputes is a 
creature of contract, wherein the employer and worker may 
voluntarily enter into an agreement to resolve workplace labor 
disputes through private arbitration.  These agreements are 
enforceable by the courts, which generally defer to the parties’ 
choice of forum and the decision therein.85 
Arbitration decisions generally are not overruled unless they 
are determined by the courts to be against public policy or there 
is a significant flaw in the arbitration process; this is so even 
where the court may not agree with the merits of the decision.86  
In the case of arbitration of individual labor disputes, the clear 
trend of the courts is to more closely scrutinize the fairness of the 
arbitration process.87 
 
81 In 2006, over ninety percent of the cases in mediation/arbitration were 
resolved. See BROWN, supra note 3, at 172, 173 tbl.14.1. In litigation, employees 
prevailed in over one half of the cases in 2005. Id. at 180. 
82 In unionized settings, the U.S. government makes available the Federal 
Mediation Conciliation Services (“FMCS”) to help resolve labor interest disputes. 
“[T]he core mission of FMCS has been, and remains, to assist labor and management 
to settle their disputes through mediation . . . .” Carolyn Brommer et al., Cooperative 
Bargaining Styles at FMCS: A Movement Toward Choices, 2 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 
465, 465 (2002). See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 172–173 (2006) (authorizing FMCS); 
Richard Barnes, FMCS on the Cutting Edge, 2 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 321 (2002) 
(discussing in detail the history and current state of FMCS). FMCS also  
provides a list of potential private arbitrators that the parties may voluntarily  
utilize. Arbitration FAQs, FED. MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERV., 
http://www.fmcs.gov/internet/faq.asp?categoryID=133&itemID=16546#Q16529 (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2012). 
83 See supra Part B.1. 
84 See supra Part C.1. 
85 See, e.g., NLRB v. Plasterers’ Local Union No. 79, 404 U.S. 116, 133 (1971). 
86 FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 46 (Alan 
Miles Ruben ed., 6th ed. 2003). 
87 See, e.g., Plasterers’ Local, 404 U.S. at 133. However, a recent U.S. Supreme 
Court decision in AT&T Mobility, LLC. v. Concepcion held that a California 
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In China, the arbitration is regulated by the government, 
though designated arbitrators may be government or non-
government employees.88  A labor tribunal is established and, if 
 
unconscionability law banning class waivers in contracts of adhesion could be used 
to avoid the enforcement of an arbitration provision in a cell phone contract 
containing such a waiver. 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748–53 (2011). The Supreme Court 
found that, in this instance, the Federal Arbitration Act preempted California 
contract law. Id. at 1753. Some have concerns this ruling could limit the courts’ 
ability to supervise labor and employment arbitration agreements for 
unconscionability and fairness. The ABA’s Section on Labor and Employment has 
noted:   
Concepcion applies only to arbitration subject to the FAA; it does not apply 
to arbitration agreements construed in state courts (for example, when the 
underlying claims do not present a basis for federal jurisdiction). State 
courts remain free to apply state law unconscionability principles to 
arbitration clauses that are challenged in state court litigation, and they 
frequently do so. See, e.g.Muhammad [sic] v. County Bank of Rehoboth 
Beach, 189 N.J. 1, 912 A.2d 88 (N.J. 2006), and Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless 
LLC, 223 Ill. 2d 1, 857 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 2006). 
 . . . Concepcion is limited to situations where the FAA preempts state law. 
To the extent federal common law includes the principles of 
unconscionability of contracts—and courts have suggested as much in other 
contexts[,] [ ]see, e.g., Operating Engineers Local 39 Health Benefit Fund. v. 
Gustafson Constr. Co., 258 F3d. 645, 655 (7th Cir. 2001); Husman Constr. 
Co. v. Purolator Courier Corp., 832 F.3d 459, 461 (8th Cir. 1987), and 
Fairfield Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Hartman, 132 F.Supp.2d 1142 (N.D. Ind. 2001)—
Concepcion may not insulate an arbitration clause from an 
unconscionability challenge. Such a challenge may be difficult, of course, in 
light of: (i) Concepcion’s strong language that arbitration clauses are to be 
enforced as agreed upon, and (ii) Concepcion’s rejection of arguments that 
consumers should be protected from adhesion contracts. In any event, if 
Congress passes legislation defining the role of arbitration in consumer and 
employment disputes, the state law preemption analysis from Concepcion 
could fall by the wayside. 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion et ux., No. 09-893, Argued November 9, 2010, 
Decided April 27, 2011, AM. BAR ASSOC., http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
newsletter/groups/labor_law/ll_hottopics/2011_aball_hottopics/11_aball_att_concepci
on.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2012).  
In the United States, there are institutional codes of conduct and procedures 
provided by the FMCS and the American Arbitration Association for the arbitrators 
to follow in those cases where the parties have chosen to utilize arbitrators from a 
list provided by them. Employment Due Process Protocol, AM. ARB. ASS’N, INC. 
(2011), available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?url=/cs/groups/lee/documents/ 
document/mdaw/mdaz/~edisp/adrstg_004368.pdf; see also Little v. Auto Stiegler, 
Inc., 63 P.3d 979 (Cal. 2003) (discussing whether an arbitration clause is 
unconscionable); Richard A. Bales, The Employment Due Process Protocol at Ten: 
Twenty Unresolved Issues, and a Focus on Conflicts of Interest, 21 OHIO ST. J. DISP. 
RESOL. 165, 171–72 (2005).  
88 BROWN, supra note 3, at 173–75. 
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mediation fails, a binding arbitration decision may be made.89  
There are prescribed rules for arbitration procedures.90 
In Japan, private arbitration is the exception.  However, the 
court’s Labor Tribunal uses arbitration with procedures, though 
its decision is enforceable only if the parties agree to it or fail to 
reject it within time limits.91 
An interesting comparative aspect of the use of arbitration in 
China, Japan, and the U.S. is the role and background of the 
arbitrators.  They may be private or governmental in Japan, 
China, and the U.S.92  How they are selected and trained (or not), 
or whether they have a code of ethics, are all variables to 
consider in the assessment of the integrity of the process. 
E. Legal Effect of Mediation Settlements and Arbitration 
Decisions 
In the U.S., mediation agreements entered into by the 
parties are treated as settlements, which are binding contracts; 
likewise, arbitration decisions are typically binding and 
enforceable by the courts.  Some limited exceptions that permit 
the setting aside of decisions exist in cases of corruption, clear 
conflicts of interest by the arbitrator, or decisions found to be 
against public policy.93 
 
89 See id. at 179 & nn.70–71; Law on Mediation and Arbitration of Labor 
Disputes, supra note 3, arts. 5, 14, 42, 47.  
90 BROWN, supra note 3, at 302–305. 
91 See Araki, supra note 2, at 10. 
92 In the United States, to be listed as an arbitrator with the Federal Mediation 
Conciliation Service you must meet the following qualifications: “(1) [Be] 
experienced, competent and acceptable in decision-making roles in the resolution of 
labor relations disputes; or (2) Ha[ve] extensive and recent experience in relevant 
positions in collective bargaining; and (3) [Be] capable of conducting an orderly 
hearing, [be able to] analyze testimony and exhibits and [be able to] prepare clear 
and concise findings and awards within reasonable time limits.” Becoming an FMCS 
Arbitrator, FED. MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERV., http://www.fmcs.gov/internet/ 
itemDetail.asp?categoryID=184&itemID=16436 (last visited Nov. 8, 2012). In China, 
you can be appointed by the government, but the law sets forth the following 
qualifications: (1) former judge; (2) research or teaching in the area; (3) knowledge or 
experience in human resource management; or, (4) lawyer for three years. BROWN, 
supra note 3, at 303. 
93 See Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Judicial Enforcement of Predispute 
Arbitration Agreements: Back to the Future, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 249, 262 
& n.79 (2003); see also Eric Sposito, Judicial Standards for Enforcement and 
Vacatur of Labor Arbitration Awards, 7 RUTGERS CONFLICT RESOL. L.J. 1, 6, 18–19 
(2009). 
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In China, mediation agreements entered into by the parties 
within any of the forums—in-house, arbitration, or courts—are 
legally enforceable by the courts.  Most arbitration decisions are 
directly enforceable by the courts.  However, certain categories of 
cases may be taken to the court for consideration.  In those cases, 
the arbitration decisions are not binding without court 
determination.94 
In Japan, mediation agreements have “the same effects as 
the compromises which are made in and authorized by the 
court.”95  Thus, “a formal court-connected mediation [conciliation] 
agreement . . . has the same effect as an absolute judgment.”96  In 
the absence of a mediated agreement, the labor dispute 
determination committee or the judge makes a determination 
“[that] loses its effect” if a party “file[s] an objection to [that] 
decision within two weeks.”97  If no such objection to the 
settlement is filed, then that determination is legally enforceable, 
similar to a judicial settlement.98 
III. MULTI-NATIONAL COMPANIES AND ADR 
Multi-national companies usually do not provide nor utilize 
traditional employee grievance procedures that end in a third-
party decision that finally settles an employment dispute.  
Rather, absent a collective bargaining contract with its grievance 
procedures, these companies must rely on the availability of local 
laws and procedures.  Somewhat frequently, internal procedures 
may be provided, most often designed to expose violations of 
standards or law rather than resolve them, under the clear 
auspices of the employer that then determines the final outcome.  
Internal mediation also may be available.  
Below are illustrations of International Labour Organization 
(“ILO”) principles, SA8000 standards and procedures, and Nike 
provisions used for its contractors—not its employees.   
 
 
94 These include appeals by the workers. BROWN, supra note 3, at 178. 
95 Ishida & Hosokawa, supra note 33, at 62. 
96 Katja Funken, Comparative Dispute Management: Court-Connected Mediation 
in Japan and Germany, 3 GERMAN L.J. ¶ 23 (2002), available at 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=130.   
97 See Outline of Civil Litigation in Japan, supra note 45.  
98 Id.  
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A. ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy 
Multinational as well as national enterprises jointly with the 
representatives and organizations of the workers whom they 
employ should seek to establish voluntary conciliation 
machinery, appropriate to national conditions, which may 
include provisions for voluntary arbitration, to assist in the 
prevention and settlement of industrial disputes between 
employers and workers.  The voluntary conciliation machinery 
should include equal representation of employers and workers.99 
B. SA8000 Standards100 
The Standards provide guidance on workers’ rights to a 
representative to present the workers’ position on employment 
issues, on eliminating discrimination, and on proper discipline 
and corrective action.101  For example, see below:   
 
99 Codes of Conduct for Multinationals, ACTRAV-TURIN LAB. EDUC. PROGRAM, 
http://actrav.itcilo.org/actrav-english/telearn/global/ilo/guide/main.htm#Summ (last 
visited Nov. 8, 2012).  
100 SA8000 Standards and Procedures utilize an externally-monitored system, 
are voluntary, and most often are used by contractors to become “eligible” for an 
award of a MNC contract. See SA 8000 Procedures, 
QUALITYMANAGEMENT.HRVINET.COM, http://qualitymanagement.hrvinet.com/sa-
8000-procedures/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2012); SA 8000 Standards, 
QUALITYMANAGEMENT.HRVINET.COM, http://qualitymanagement.hrvinet.com/sa-
8000-standard/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2012); see also Michael J. Hiscox et al., 
Evaluating the Impact of SA8000 Certification, in SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 8000: 
THE FIRST DECADE—IMPLEMENTATION, INFLUENCE, AND IMPACT 147, 147 (Deborah 
Leipziger ed., 2009), available at http://www.people.hbs.edu/mtoffel/ 
publications/HiscoxSchwartzToffel2009.pdf. 
101 SA8000 Worker Representative: 
9.3 The company shall recognize that workplace dialogue is a key 
component of social accountability and ensure that all workers have the 
right to representation to facilitate communication with senior 
management in matters relating to SA8000. In unionised facilities, such 
representation shall be undertaken by recognized trade union(s). 
Elsewhere, workers may elect a SA8000 worker representative from among 
themselves for this purpose. In no circumstances, shall the SA8000 worker 
representative be seen as a substitute for trade union representation. 
 SOC. ACCOUNTABILITY INT’L, SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 8000 8 (2008), available at 
http://www.sa-intl.org/_data/n_0001/resources/live/2008StdEnglishFinal.pdf. 
More specific standards provide:  
5. Discrimination rules in SA 8000  
The company shall not engage in or support discrimination in hiring, 
remuneration, access to training, promotion, termination or retirement 
based on race, caste, national origin, religion, disability, gender, sexual 
orientation, union membership, political affiliation, or age. 
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15. Addressing Concerns and Taking Corrective Action:  The 
company shall investigate, address, and respond to the concerns 
of employees and other interested parties with regard to 
conformance/non-conformance with the company’s policy and/or 
the requirements of this standard; the company shall refrain 
from disciplining, dismissing or otherwise discriminating 
against any employee for providing information concerning 
observance of the standard.102 
SA8000 provides pertinent implementing procedures, as well 
as standards.  Its procedures are focused on ADR within the 
enterprise.103 
 
 . . . . 
7. Disciplinary practices in SA 8000  
The company shall not engage in or support the use of corporal 
punishment, mental or physical coercion, and verbal abuse. 
. . . . 
15. Addressing Concerns and Taking Corrective Action  
The company shall investigate, address, and respond to the concerns of 
employees and other interested parties with regard to conformance/non-
conformance with the company’s policy and/or the requirements of this 
standard; the company shall refrain from disciplining, dismissing or 
otherwise discriminating against any employee for providing information 
concerning observance of the standard.  
SA 8000 Standards, supra note 100. 
102 SA 8000 Standards, supra note 100. 
103 Id. 
Reviewing procedure for complaint and discipline 
1. PURPOSE: 
To examine and give complaint about the implementation of discipline on 
employee and to protect the employee’s right as regulated by laws about 
exposing and complaining. 
2. SCOPE:  
This procedure applies to the examination of discipline implementation and 
complaint in the company. 
. . . .  
4. CONTENT: 
4.1. Examine the implementation of discipline: 
4.1.1. All the violations of regulation of the company are recorded as form 
No: 0012. The recorder has responsibility to note down all the violation 
content and asked [sic] related parties to sign. If the violator refuses to 
sign, write down the reasons. 
4.1.2. The violation record will be sent to the head of the division where the 
violator works in [sic] to commend (if have) and forward to the 
Administrative Department for solving. 
4.1.3. The violator has responsibility to make a statement about what 
happened, give the divisional head to commend and then send to the 
Administrative Department. 
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C. Nike ADR Provisions in Its Code of Conduct for 
Contractors104 
6. EFFECTIVE GRIEVANCE PROCESS 
The contractor shall establish an effective grievance process 
that enables employees to address their concerns regarding 
working conditions and terms and conditions of employment.  
The specific grievance process will vary from factory to factory 
depending upon its size, local laws, culture, etc.  But in general, 
an effective grievance process includes:   
 
4.1.4. This Department has responsibility to collect all the opinion [sic], 
evaluate the violation[,] then invite the violator and related parties to come 
to discuss about [sic] the problem. 
4.1.5. This department has responsibility to write down the solving 
opinions and present to the Board for considering and deciding. Then, it 
has to send the decision to the violator within 2 days since the decision is 
made. 
4.1.6. If the problem is too serious and complex, the administrative 
department makes a report and present [sic] to the General Director for 
approval to organize a meeting to discuss about [sic] the problem. 
Attendants are: [t]he General Director or the representative, [l]abor union 
representative, head of [a]dministrative department, violator, and 
deponent (if have), defendant (if have) and the representative of people who 
made the report. 
4.1.7. The decision to dismiss the employee of labor union must have 
opinion [sic] from the Union chairman and from the higher level Labor 
Union (if the violator is the union chairman). 
4.2. Complain and consider implementing the discipline 
The complaint period is 15 days since the violator receives the decision. 
When receiving complaint, [t]he Administrative Department will invite the 
board representative (one person), [A]dministrative [D]epartment (one 
person), violator’s divisional head (one person), and [l]abor union 
representative (one person) and make a meditation board. Invite the 
violator as well as the deponent to the meeting and ask for their opinion. 
This board makes a [sic] successful or unsuccessful mediation minutes. 
This [sic] minutes will be kept along with the case record. After that, the 
claimant may send another complaint to the Labor Union, Labor 
office . . . to solve if not satisfied. 
Reviewing Procedure For Complaint And Discipline, 
QUALITYMANAGEMENT.HRVINET.COM, 
http://qualitymanagement.hrvinet.com/reviewing-procedure-for-complaint-and-
discipline/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2012). 
104 Note that these provisions are used for Nike’s contractors—not its employees. 
NIKE INC., NIKE CODE LEADERSHIP STANDARDS (2011), available at 
http://nikeinc.com/system/assets/6276/Nike_Code_Leadership_Standards_Jan2012_o
riginal.pdf?1325287549. Nike employees have their own standards with violations 
enforced by the employer. See generally NIKE, INC., INSIDE THE LINES: THE NIKE 
CODE OF ETHICS (2008), available at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item= 
UGFyZW50SUQ9MTkyfENoaWxkSUQ9LTF8VHlwZT0z&t=1. 
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a. A written grievance policy and implementing procedures.  
The policy should include. [sic] 
i. Multiple channels for employees to raise concerns and provide 
input to management.  For example: grievance/suggestion 
boxes; supervisors/team leaders; HR department/counselors; 
trade union/worker representatives; “open door” policy; 
company “hotlines”; third-parties, worker committees, meetings 
between management and worker’s representatives, etc; and 
ii. The ability to raise concerns confidentially (or anonymously), 
subject to the requirements of country law, if the employee so 
desires without fear of retaliation. 
b. Effective communication of the grievance policy to employees 
so that employees are aware of the grievance process and their 
right to raise concerns. 
c. Training of staff responsible for responding to grievances 
regarding the policy and their roles and responsibilities; and 
d. A means to document and track grievances to ensure there is 
a timely response back to the employee. 
IV. COMMON THEMES AND COMPARATIVE CONTRASTS 
Common themes are found in each country’s approach to 
resolving individual labor disputes.  Mediation, occasionally 
conciliation, arbitration, and litigation are used by all, though at 
times placed in different ADR forums and utilized by differently 
trained personnel.  Also, government regulatory frameworks and 
a government forum are most often used to bring and resolve 
labor claims.  Most provide multiple avenues in seeking redress, 
often distinguishing between labor rights originating in contract 
or statute. 
Comparative contrasts are highlighted by China’s “one-stop” 
forum for resolving labor claims using mediation and arbitration 
and Japan’s successful Labor Tribunal System used by its courts.  
By contrast, the U.S., except in the case of collective bargaining 
contracts, traditionally uses the courts in individual employment 
contract disputes and the administrative processes for statutory 
claims, with the right of judicial review.  The latter requires 
using a particular administrative agency, among many, and its 
procedures and methods of ADR.  Private arbitration is used 
where there is a collective bargaining contract or an individual 
agreement between the employee and the employer to use the 
arbitration forum.  The U.S. Supreme Court also has sanctioned  
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the use of private arbitration for resolving both individual and 
collective statutory labor rights, though at this time it is not 
widely utilized. 
While each country uses mediation in resolving labor 
disputes, unsuccessful mediation in the initial steps in the U.S., 
China, or Japan does not foreclose further steps in ADR.  In fact, 
in most cases the next step in redressing employee claims, again, 
is the mediation process in a different forum.  For example, in 
the transition from the administrative process to the judicial 
process, the judges will first try mediation.  In Japan, 
unsuccessful mediation in the Labor Tribunal will lead to a non-
binding, recommendatory arbitration decision to which the 
parties must agree, or else it moves on to court procedures, which 
itself may first utilize mediation. 
The finality of arbitration decisions varies.  For example, the 
last step in Japan’s Labor Tribunal System is a recommendatory 
settlement (non-binding arbitration?):  If not accepted, it moves 
into the court proceedings for adjudication.  China, like the U.S., 
has a system of finality for most cases, but court enforcement 
may be required; and, in China’s case, there may be court 
jurisdiction for a certain limited number of categories. 
The MNCs, thus far, have not generally embraced traditional 
private, internal grievance procedures for their employees’ labor 
claims, though there is a hint that there may be some to come, 
especially the use of mediation, even including external 
mediation.105  Rather, the MNCs rely on local laws and practices 
in resolving employee grievances where normal discussions or 
internal mechanisms under the employer’s control do not produce 
resolution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
105 Some small experimentation project is taking place in China using law 
students as the external mediators. 
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FIGURE 5: 
ADR PROCESSES: COMMON THEMES AND COMPARATIVE 
CONTRASTS OF INDIVIDUAL LABOR RIGHTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V. LESSONS AND QUESTIONS? 
Certainly, comparative study of other country’s approaches 
can provide ideas for rethinking and perhaps redesigning 
approaches in one’s own country.  Is there a “best approach” for 
ADR to resolve employment disputes—one that can serve as a 
model or a guide for a country or an MNC?  
In the search for the best approach, an old idea of a “labor 
court” in the U.S. might resurface.  These courts would combine 
the many labor laws and their multiple administrative ADR 
approaches under a common umbrella with the same general 
procedures used for resolving the disputes, whether they 
originate in contract or statute—perhaps a super agency—housed 
in either an administrative or judicial forum.  Or, in the U.S., 
after the Supreme Court in 14 Penn Plaza authorized the private 
arbitration model for labor contracts and statutory rights 
disputes, could the private arbitration system be a model? 
The rethinking could benefit from knowing that the 
Japanese Labor Tribunal System has been very successful within 
the Japanese culture, which values mediation.  Though housed in 
the court, it also utilizes non-judges in its mediation and 
recommendatory arbitration decisions.  Japan also provides a 
worker-friendly “one stop” consultation and mediation agency to 
deal with the myriad of worker employment-related 
complaints.106 
 
106 As discussed in above text (with chart and statistics), employees can go to the 
agency instead of going to all the various agencies as is done in the United States. 
The alternative is to go to court. 
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The Chinese labor arbitration system offers employers and 
employees a single institution to resolve most employment 
disputes.  It also can and does utilize non-government 
arbitrators.  
In the U.S., private arbitration is highly touted and prized, 
and authorized for use by the U.S. Supreme Court.107  How 
devastating would it be to house or regulate an arbitration 
system under a more government-regulated system of 
procedures, possibly paralleling the sets of rules of the private 
American Arbitration Association and/or the government’s 
FMCS?  Could there be government institutions with expanded 
jurisdiction using “private” arbitrators (like the FMCS?), or 
private arbitration with “government” arbitrators or government-
regulated arbitrators? 
Debate and evaluation could be the possible advantages of a 
government-housed, “single court/tribunal.”  The increased 
efficiency and possible cost savings in replacing some of the 
functions of overlapping administrative agencies would need to 
be balanced against the possible loss in expertise in subject 
matters and in statutory balances, though perhaps the impact is 
less in contract disputes where judges accept every type of 
employment contract matter.108 
Complementary to the above is to consider increased 
emphasis on meaningful, non-employer-dominated internal 
procedures used by employers to address the inevitable labor 
disputes and to diminish the use of the typical legal ADR 
processes.  Advantages to employers, including MNCs, of using 
internal, private ADR procedures that might use expert external 
mediators would be to substitute this process for the external 
administrative and judicial procedures with their inevitable 
attendant vagaries and delays.  On the other hand, an argument 
can be made that the expertise and legal institutional structures 
which use mediation are already in place and available, so why 
duplicate them with a private system?  And should statutory 
labor rights really be privatized? 
 
107 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25–26 (1991); 
Alexandrowicz, supra note 67, at 1041. 
108 Could the functions of the U.S. agencies’ approach of using rule-making and 
providing “guidelines” be consolidated, eliminated, or replaced with “adjudication” 
as, to some extent, is the practice with the NLRB? Could it make sense to re-locate a 
consulting/advising/conciliating function into a “one-stop shop,” with specialized 
departments, as is done in Japan? 
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For the MNCs and likely most employers, the reality is that 
they are quite resistant to any voluntary procedure that causes 
relinquishment of control over their employees.  Thus, 
mediation—utilizing external mediators—rather than 
arbitration, could be a viable alternative to dealing with 
employees’ labor disputes, perhaps depending on the cost factor.  
Currently, there is some experimentation underway in China 
utilizing this approach.109 
In the final analysis, the “take away” from understanding 
the ADR approaches of Japan, China, and the U.S. might be to 
think of ways to improve present systems.  Perhaps “borrowing” 
and “learning” from other countries’ experiences and creating 
“something new”: the perennial, “better mouse trap?”  
The MNCs—and employers generally—might find that a 
modest relinquishment of authority over labor dispute settlement 
by utilizing more mediation can have positive effects on employee 
morale, human resource management practices, and 
productivity.  Likewise, consideration could be given to whether 
there might be sufficient advantages in utilizing more arbitration 
processes: the binding and private U.S. model, the 
recommendatory and governmental Japanese model, or the 
binding and governmental Chinese model.  MNCs should also 
consider whether the utilized mediation and arbitration 
provisions should embrace all individual labor disputes, only 
contractual disputes, or only statutory disputes. 
If an American group of academics, legislators, practitioners 
of law and industrial relations were tasked to consider possible 
reconfiguration of the best system of individual labor dispute 
resolution for the most workers, with due consideration of 
management’s interests, and excluding political considerations, 
what recommendations would likely be made?  Drawing upon the 
international experiences in Japan and China, and the new 
authority in the U.S. for “privatizing” the arbitration of labor 
disputes, which dominant themes for reform, if any, would 
emerge and what recommendations could be predicted, 
considering a labor court, an industrial tribunal, private or 
government decisionmakers, binding or recommendatory 
decisions, status quo, et cetera?  
 
109 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
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Some private experiments in ADR are already underway, for 
example with former Chair of the NLRB, William B. Gould IV, 
serving as an independent monitor selected by an 
internationally-based employer, FirstGroup, to investigate and 
recommend remedies for alleged individual labor rights in the 
workplace tailored to labor relations.110  Perhaps other privately-
 
110 William B. Gould IV, Using an Independent Monitor To Resolve Union-
Organizing Disputes Outside the NLRB: The FirstGroup Experience, 66 DISP. RESOL. 
J. 46, 48 (2011). In 2007, FirstGroup purchased Laidlaw International, Inc. for $3.6 
billion. Id. at 50. Laidlaw was the largest operator of yellow school buses, “making 
First Group America’s school bus unit (First Student) the leading student 
transportation provider in North America, serving more than 1,500 school districts 
with more than 60,000 buses.” Id. “The deal also increased operations at the transit 
management unit (First Transit), which employs 15,500 people and operates 7,000 
buses out of 235 locations in 41 states, Canada and Puerto Rico.” Id. The author 
wrote of the “Independent Monitor Program:”   
Facing an aggressive union organizing campaign at its U.S. subsidiary, a 
multi-national company implemented an unprecedented ADR program to 
address complaints that management violated the company’s corporate 
social responsibility policy and its commitment to the right of employees to 
associate with a union. The program, known as the Independent Monitor[,] 
could be a model for other companies. 
. . . . 
Complaints needed to be submitted within 60 days of the alleged violation, 
and submitting a complaint did not affect the right to file a ULP charge or 
to complain to any public agency. 
. . . . 
After the investigation . . . the investigator prepared a preliminary report 
for the Independent Monitor that laid out the facts of the case . . . . If the 
Independent Monitor found a violation of the FoA Policy, he made 
recommendations for actions to be taken by the company to cure the 
violation. 
The company had to decide how to respond to the Independent Monitor’s 
recommendations. It did not have to accept any recommendations. Within 
30 days it could adopt, reject, or modify them. It could decide to accept some 
recommendations and reject the rest from the same report. To provide 
transparency, the company would send its response to the report to both 
the Independent Monitor and the complaining party.  
. . . . 
During the IM Program’s three-year tenure, the Independent Monitor 
received complaints alleging 372 violations of the FoA Policy and issued 
143 written reports. Complaints alleged, among other things, that a 
manager or supervisor discriminated against an employee based on union 
activity, made anti-union comments, enforced overly broad no talking, 
solicitation, and distribution rules, or prohibited the wearing of union 
insignia.  
Of the 372 alleged violations, 32 were withdrawn prior to the issuance of 
a report, and 72 were found to be outside the jurisdiction of the 
Independent Monitor because they asserted general workplace grievances 
that did not involve union activity, or were not filed within 60 days of the 
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based experiments, including employers’ internal third-party 
monitoring system procedures such as those just described, or 
use of other third-party monitoring programs like SA8000 for 
example, could lead to broader reforms? 
 
 
incident, as required by the program. In those instances, the Independent 
Monitor informed the complaining party of the company’s confidential 
employee hotline. 
. . . . 
Slightly over one-half of the complaints were filed by employees while the 
rest were filed mainly by unions. Five complaints were referred to the 
program directly by the company. 
. . . . 
Complaints were promptly investigated and reported on within 45 days, on 
average, and 85% of the cases were completed in less than 90 days. 
Id. at 46, 53. 
